Research

Job Market Paper:

“Privacy Regulation and Optimal Product Design”

Abstract: This paper studies how privacy regulation shapes a seller’s product design. In a circular city environment, the firm chooses a product design before observing a noisy signal of a consumer’s preferences and setting a personalized price. Privacy regulation determines the informativeness of this signal and limits the firm’s ability to target consumers. I show that the seller’s optimal product design responds non-monotonically to privacy. Greater privacy can induce either broader or more niche products. The extent depends on how it interacts with the firm’s pricing incentives. I then examine the resulting implications for consumer welfare.

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Working Papers

“Information Acquisition in the Market for Lemons” with Kyungmin Kim and Guram Lobzhanidze

Abstract: We consider a dynamic decentralized market in which sellers possess private information about the quality of their unit and buyers can acquire information about the quality of their randomly matched partner. We assume that buyers’ information acquisition is fully flexible subject to uniformly posterior-separable information costs. We characterize stationary market equilibria and show that complementarity between buyers’ screening and sellers’ trading incentives can cause equilibrium multiplicity, and lower information costs can be harmful to buyers and even Pareto worsening.

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Works in Progress

“Optimal Consumer Privacy with an Expert”

Abstract: I study consumer privacy choice in a setting where a consumer, who is uncertain about which product suits him, receives a product recommendation from an expert. The expert has some intrinsic concern for match suitability (honest recommendation) but can be influenced by commissions offered by the product providers. I show that more precise information about consumers leads the recommended firm to charge a higher price, while less precise information leads firms to compete in commissions, which extracts the consumer’s surplus entirely. The consumer-optimal amount of information is therefore the least precise that still deters commissions. I then show that when commissions are disclosed to the consumer, an equilibrium without commissions always exists, and commissions are ruled out entirely for a wider range of the expert’s concern for suitability. Disclosure therefore never lowers the consumer’s surplus and allows him to share less information.